Among the Tibetan Buddhist Abhisamayālaṃkāra exegetes, ’Bre Shes-rab-’bar and Ar Byang-chub-ye-shes came to be referred to as the ’Bre-Ar Duo (’bre ar gnyis). As pointed out by sKa-ba Shes-rab-bzang-po in his forward to the collected writings of Ar Byang-chub-ye-shes published in Lhasa (pp. 1–5), Ar Byang-chub-ye-shes who lived in the eleventh–twelfth century is not to be identified, as done by Dung-dkar Blo-bzang-phrin-las, with dBus-pa Blo-gsal who lived in the thirteenth century. Until recently, we had no direct access to the writings and thoughts of Ar Byang-chub-ye-shes. But thanks to recent discoveries published in the bKa’ gdams gsung ’bum, materials of untold value are now at our disposal. The current prevailing Tibetan Buddhist schools may not directly identify with the doctrinal positions of Ar Byang-chub-ye-shes, but in terms of the history of the Buddhist ideas in Tibet, his writings are significant textual testimonies. I wish to mention just one example.
In her study, “Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavāda: A Late Indian Subclassification of Madhyamaka and its Reception in Tibet,” Orna Almogi states the following (Almogi 2010: 136):
“However, I should perhaps concede from the very outset that while I was preparing this article for publication it became increasingly clear that I have just barely managed to scratch the surface and that there is still a long way to go before we can fully understand this division of Madhyamaka in general, and Madhyamaka in Tibet during the eleventh to thirteenth centuries in particular.”
And further on, she states (Almogi 2010: 182):
“Nonetheless, since all Indian sources cited above present the matter from the Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavādin viewpoint, one wonders whether there was anyone at all who considered himself a Māyopamavādin—that is, in the sense portrayed by their Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavādin ʻopponentsʼ—or whether the entire ‘controversy’ and ʻdebateʼ took place, at least initially, within Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavādin circles alone with (more or less) imaginary opponents.”
In his commentary on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra called the mNgon rtogs rgyan gyi ’grel pa rnam ’byed, which is indeed a super/sub-commentary on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, Ar identifies those who have fallen into the extremes of depreciation (apavāda: skur pa ’debs pa) and superimposition (samāropa/ samāropaṇa; adhyāropa/adhyāropaṇa: sgro ’dogs pa), and both Mādhyamikas, namely, dBu-ma-sgyu-ma-lta-bu (i.e. Māyopamādvayavādin) and [dBu-ma]-rab-tu-mi-gnas-pa (i.e. Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavādin) have been equally presented positively as those who are in the right tract. And then Ar states the following (p. 298.6–9):
de yang yang dag tu zhen pa dang | sgyu mar zhen pa na yang [= pa yang?] shes bya’i sgrib pa yin pas de gnyis dgag pa’i don du rim gyis bstan pa yin gyis | sgyu ma rig pa’i [= rigs pas? cf. the expression: sgyu ma rigs grub pa] shes byar khas len pa ni ma yin no || des na dbu mar khas len pa gcig gis kyang gnyis ka khas len par bya ba yin no || don du na bden pa gnyis la mkhas pa’o ||; “That is, also the clinging to [phenomena] as being truly/absolutely existent and clinging to [phenomena] as being illusory are obscurations [that hinder the cognitive access to] the objects of knowledge (jñeyāvaraṇa: shes bya’i sgrib pa). Thus, in order to negate these two [kinds of clinging], [the Māyopamādvayavāda and Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavāda doctrines] have been taught in a sequence, and it is not so [that the Māyopamādvayavādins] posit the illusory [phenomena] to be objects of [Madhyamic] logical reasonings. Thus both [positions of Māyopamādvayavāda and Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavāda] should be accepted even by one Mādhyamika proponent. Actually, [both Māyopamādvayavādins and Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavādins] are [equally] skilled in the two modes of reality.”
I wish to make two points in this regard. First, if the above text is tolerably correct and if my hypothetical understanding of it holds, at least Ar’s understanding of the Māyopamādvayavāda–Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavāda distinction seems to corroborate Almogi’s statement above, that is, we need not anticipate the existence of separate Māyopamādvayavādins. And indeed, it appears that Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavāda position presupposes and rests on Māyopamādvayavāda illusionism. This seems particularly true for Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavādins such as Rong-zom-pa. The metaphysical ground-less-ness, or, abyss, of all saṃsāric and nirvāṇic phenomena, and the feasibility of Karmological and Budhological mechanism, and the ideas of pratibhāsamātra and idaṃpratyayatāmātra, proposed by the Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavādins hinge on the doctrine Māyopamādvayavāda illusionism. Second, Ar’s distinction of the Māyopamādvayavāda and Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavāda somehow reminds one of Mi-pham’s distinction of the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka and Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka. That is, according to Mi-pham, the difference between the two does not lie in whether or not the two establish the true reality fully and correctly but rather in how they eliminate the four extremes. Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas do so gradually/sequentially, and the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas negate all four extremes from the very outset. What Ar is saying in effect is that one can be both a Māyopamādvayavādin and a Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavādin. One starts as a Māyopamādvayavādin and culminates as a Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavādin.
Bibliography
dPal-brtsegs-bod-yig-dpe-rnying-zhib-’jug-khang (ed.), Ar byang chub ye shes kyi gsung chos skor. bKa’- gdams-dpe-dkon-gces-btus 2. Beijing: Krung-go’i-bod-rig-pa-dpe-skrun-khang, 2006.
Orna Almogi, “Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavāda: A Late Indian Subclassification of Madhyamaka and its Reception in Tibet.” Journal of the International College for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies 14, 2010, pp. 135–212.
Pratisaṃvid 