Recently in Harvard (December 6, 2023), I learnt that Professor Janet Gyatso is interested in what one might call “zoo-epistemology,” perhaps simplistically, in the sense of the theory of how animals (tiryañc: dud ’gro) know their objects of knowledge. For heuristic purposes, also when speaking of zoo-epistemology, we may think of two kinds of (means of) knowledge, namely, perceptual (non-conceptual) and conceptual. On the spur of the moment, I told Professor Gyatso that her interest in the topic reminds me of how Mi-pham rNam-rgyal-rgya-mtsho (1846–1912), in his mKhas ’jug, attempts to explain the manner in which animals infer the presence of water by its sound. This remark of mine sparked her interest and she promised that she will get back to me, and she did. Instead of simply pointing out to some sources, I thought that I should rather collect my thoughts and offer Professor Gyatso some possible venues for exploration.
First, issues pertinent to zoo-epistemology are bound to be found in abundance in the Tibetan Buddhist commentarial literature dealing with the phrase pūyabuddhiḥ pretasya nadyām (chu ’bab klung la yi dwags rnag blo) found in Madhyamakāvatāra 6.71 (Li 2015: 13; Tib. Uryuzu & Nakazawa 2012: 14). The point of departure in the rNying-ma tradition for discourses on zoo-epistemology may well be Rong-zom-pa’s sNang ba lhar sgrub (Sad-mi-mi-bzhi 2018, etc.) and Mi-pham’s Nges shes sgron me (Pettit 1999, etc.). On an earlier occasion, I happened to discuss what I called “the relativity theory of the purity and validity of perception” (Wangchuk 2009). Buddhist sources presuppose or propose that what is known to us as “water” can be perceived in various ways by various kinds of awakened and non-awakened sentient beings including animals (e.g., fish). How would fish, for example, perceive what we call “water”? Though zoo-epistemology would not be the main or actual issue in such contexts, one might find things that are of interest and relevance.
Second, the editors of the Indo-Tibetan Lexical Resource (ITLR) have published an entry on parivrāṭkāmukaśva (kun rgyu chags can khyi), expressing a famous idea that one object (i.e., body of a woman) would be perceived differently by different beings including carnivores such as a dog. See https://www.itlr.net/hwid:901332. We made an attempt here to gather whatever sources we could find.
Third, Rong-zom-pa in his Theg chen tshul ’jug (Tashi Dorjee 2021: 547) has famously used the analogy of what he calls ri dwags me’i gtsang sbra can. The Sanskrit expression found in Kambala’s Ālokamālā turns out to be agniśauco mṛgaḥ (Szántó 2020: 14, 25). According to Kalhaṇa’s Rājataraṅgiṇī, it would be agniśaucaḥ sāraṅgaḥ (Szántó 2020: 11). Rong-zom-pa’s main point in employing this analogy seems to be that the characteristics of phenomena such as the hotness of fire are not as absolute as we take them to be. If, for example, the hotness of fire were absolute, it should be able to burn anyone but this animal (i.e., agniśauco mṛgaḥ: ri dwags me’i gtsang sbra can) not only lives in fire but it lives on fire. How would such an idea be relevant to zoo-epistemology? Perhaps we may say that the tactile perception (kāyavijñāna: lus kyi rnam par shes pa) of the agniśauco mṛgaḥ is radically different from those of most animals.
Fourth, Rong-zom-pa in his Theg chen tshul ’jug (Tashi Dorjee 2021: 618, cf. 380–381) also employs the analogy of the optical/visual organ of a jackal (lce spyang gi mig). The point he is trying to make with this is that light and darkness, day and night, and thus by implication science (rig pa) and nescience (ma riga pa), nirvāṇa and saṃsāra, would make no difference to those, for example, a jackal, who can perceive objects both in light and darkness, day and night. To an Atiyogin, the very ajñāna/avidya shines as jñāna/vidya, and the limitation of the duality of science and nescience, nirvāṇa and saṃsāra, is not given for him.
Fifth, the reference that I promised I will share with Professor Gyatso is Mi-pham’s explanation of how animals such as horses infer the presence of water by hearing its sound. The larger context of the passage is his discussion of how conceptual construction, conceptualization, or, conceptual mind (rtog pa) operates and works. In other words, he is trying to explain the mechanism behind inferential valid cognition (anumānapramāṇa: rjes su dpag pa’i tshad ma). The pertinent passage in his mKhas ’jug reads (p. 493.5–12): brda byed mi shes pa’i skye bo byis pa chung ngu rnams dang rta sogs dud ’gro rnams kyis kyang blo la zas skom sogs kyi don spyi tsam snang ba de ming dang ’dres pa med kyang | ’dres su rung ba’i don spyi’i rtog pa de’i sgo nas don la ’jug ldog byed pa yin te | dper na chu dngos su ma mthong yang | chu shag shag ’bab pa’i sgra thos pa na | skom pas gdung pa’i dud ’gro rnams kyis kyang chu’i rnam pa blo la shar nas de ’dod pa’i rnam ’gyur gyi sgra sgrog pa dang | rgyang ring po’i chu yi rjes su snyog zhes pa lta bus de yi tshul shes par byed do ||. The key term underlying the idea is śabdārthaghaṭanāyogya (sgra don ’drer rung ba = sgra don sbyor bar rung ba), a term which is recorded in Negi et al. 1993–2005. Tibetan scholars such as Mi-pham appear to distinguish between the actual sgra don ’dres ’dzin (“grasping [the object] by integrating (i.e., mixing, associating, identifying) the idea/concept/term [of an entity] with the entity[-itself]” and mere sgra don ’drer rung ba (“feasibility/possibility of integrating the concept [of an entity] with the entity[-itself]”). The former pertains to the mechanism of language and logic of those who are trained in language and the latter for those who are not (or not yet) trained in languages/signs. It is the latter that is relevant to zoo-epistemology. Animals such as horses are able to infer the presence of water, seek and obtain it, and quench their thirst. That is, although water and sound of water are two different entities, animals do have the conceptual capacity to associate and identify them as one and thereby enabling them to pursue and obtain their desired goals.
Sixth, one may also add here the idea that vultures can see distant objects. In this regard, scholars often refer to Dharmakīrti, Pramāṇavarttika 1.33cd (Miyasaka 1972: 8): pramāṇaṃ dūradarśī ced eta gṛdhrān upāsmahe ||; Tib. (Miyasaka 1971/1972: 9): gal te ring mthong tshad yin na || tshur shog bya rgod brten par gyis ||. See also Negi et al. 1993–2005: s.v. bsten par gyis; dGe-’dun-chos-’phel, Legs sbyar bang mdzod (Wangdi 2022: 92); Moriyama 2014: 17; Saccone 2019: 463–464, n. 30.
Selected Bibliography
Li 2015 = Xuezhu Li (ed.), “Madhyamakāvatāra-kārikā: Chapter 6.” Journal of Indian Philosophy 43, 2015, pp. 1–30.
Miyasaka 1971/1972 = Yūsho Miyasaka (ed.), “Pramāṇavārttikakārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan).” Indo Koten Kenkyū (Acta Indologica) 2, 1971/1972, pp. 1–206.
mKhas ’jug = Mi-pham rNam-rgyal-rgya-mtsho, mKhas pa’i tshul la ’jug pa’i sgo zhes bya ba’i bstan bcos. Chengdu: Si-khron-mi-rigs-dpe-skrun-khang, 1990, pp. 153–519.
Moriyama 2014 = Shinya Moriyama, Omniscience and Religious Authority: A Study on Prajñnākaragupta’s Pramāṇvarttikālaṅkārabhāṣya ad Pramāṇavarttika II 8–10 and 29–33. Leipziger Studien zur Kultur und Geschichte Süd- und Zentralasiens 4. Zürich-Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2014.
Negi et al. 1993–2005 = J. S. Negi et al., Bod skad dang legs sbyar gyi tshig mdzod chen mo: Tibetan-Sanskrit Dictionary. 16 vols. Sarnath: Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, Dictionary Unit, 1993–2005.
Pettit 1999 = John W. Pettit, Mipham’s Beacon of Certainty: Illuminating the View of Dzogchen, the Great Perfection. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1999.
Saccone 2019 = Margherita Serena Saccone, “Of Authoritativeness and Perception: On Establishing an Omniscient Person (against the Mīmāṃsakas).” In Wind Horses: Tibetan, Himalayan and Mongolian Studies. I Cavalli del Vento. Studi tibetani, himalayani e mongoli, edited by A. Drocco, L. Galli, C. Letizia, G. Orofino & C. Simioli. Series Minor 88. Naples: Università degli Studi di Napoli, Dipartimento Asia, Africa e Mediterraneo, 2019, pp. 455–483.
Sad-mi-mi-bzhi 2018 = mKhan-po bKra-shis-rdo-rje, mKhan-po O-rgyan-rig-’dzin, mKhan-po dPal-bzang-dar-rgyas & Slob-dpon-ma (now mKhan-mo) Karma-dbyangs-can, sNang ba lhar sgrub pa’i tshul la brtag pa | rong zom pa’i mdzad rnam dang | snang ba lhar sgrub chen mo’i zhib dpyad zhu dag | de’i brjod bya rjod byed la brtag pa |. sNga-’gyur-rnying-ma’i-zhib-’jug 1. Bylakuppe, Mysore: Ngagyur Nyingma Research Centre, 2018.
Szántó 2020 = Péter-Dániel Szántó, “Asbestos and Salamander in India.” Indo-Iranian Journal 63, 2020, pp. 335–370.
Tashi Dorjee 2021 = mKhan-po bKra-shis-rdo-rje (Khenpo Tashi Dorjee), Chos bzang rigs pa’i rnam dpyod: Rong zom pa ma hā paṇḍi ta’i theg tshul rjod byed zhib dpyad zhu dag lung khungs ngos ’dzin dang | brjod bya gnas lugs rig par rtsad zhib tshom bu. Ngagyur Nyingma Research Centre Publication Series 3. Bylakuppe, Mysore: Ngagyur Nyingma Institute, Ngagyur Nyingma Research Centre, 2021.
Uryuzu & Nakazawa 2012 = Ryushin Uryuzu & Mitsuru Nakazawa (eds.), [A Critical Edition of the Tibetan Translation of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra and Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya]. Online: http://kishin-syobo.com/index.php?%E8%B3%87%E6%96%99, 2012 (PDF with Running Pagination).
Wangchuk 2009 = Dorji Wangchuk, “A Relativity Theory of the Purity and Validity of Perception in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism.” In Yogic Perception, Meditation and Altered States of Consciousness, edited by Eli Franco in collaboration with Dagmar Eigner. Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences, 2009, pp. 215–239.
Wangdi 2022 = Tashi Wangdi, ‘A Sanskritic Treasure Trove’ (Legs sbyar bang mdzod): A Text-Critical Study of the Anthology of Sanskrit Verses Collected by A-mdo dGe-’dun-chos-’phel (1903–1951). Doctoral Dissertation. Hamburg: Universität Hamburg, 2022 [is being revised and not yet publicly available].
Pratisaṃvid 